Counting the development costs of the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria:the economic impact of the Boko Haram-led insurgency by Ikpe, Eka
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/14678802.2017.1371987
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ikpe, E. (2017). Counting the development costs of the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria: the economic impact of
the Boko Haram-led insurgency. Conflict, Security & Development, 381-409.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2017.1371987
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Counting the development costs of the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria: the 
economic impact of the Boko Haram-led insurgency 
 
“Many in the south of the country feel that the threat of Boko Haram, whilst 
unfortunate, is confined to the north. The economic divide between the two regions, if 
superficial before, is now very much entrenched”.  
BBC News March 27 20151 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Nigeria presents a conundrum for reflections on the interaction between economic 
emergence and security not least on account of the Boko Haram- led insurgency. In 
2014, Nigeria’s ascension as Africa’s largest economy following its statistical 
rebasing of GDP assessment was accompanied by reflections on the fundamental 
dysfunction evidenced by rising luxury consumption and devastation in the North-
East.2 This case offers an opportunity to interrogate longstanding theoretical 
assumptions about the economic consequences of violent conflict in such a complex 
space.   
 
Since 2009, the militant group who identify as Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati 
Wal Jihad, and is known widely as Boko Haram, has claimed responsibility for 
various attacks on civilians, security personnel and infrastructure including schools, 
health facilities, security establishments, among others in North-Eastern Nigeria. One 
of its most prominent early attacks was in Bauchi city over 25-30 July 2009 with 
reported fatalities of over 1118 people in this period.3 The conflict has been 
characterised by a forthright challenge to Nigeria’s statehood with periods of 
widespread loss of territory and continuous undermining of the military.  Much focus 
has been on the violence wreaked by the Group, however, the conflict is defined also 
by extra-judicial violence deployed by state security actors and associated bodies 
against civilians in affected communities.4 There are various threads of thought 
around the Group’s motivations including: opposition to Western influences, political 
agitation against a corrupt political elite, income disparities and poverty, structural 
violence, religious fundamentalism and coopting by global violent extremist groups.5 
The Group is culpable for violent acts that led to the highest number of deaths 
amongst civilians, numbering 6664, in attacks by violent extremists in 2014.6 
 
The focus on Nigeria evidences the significance of case study research design as a 
methodological approach that privileges contextual complexity across historical, 
geographical, political and economic spheres. In particular, it is possible to draw 
attention to the frailties in the process of establishing lines of causality from violent 
conflict to particular developmental outcomes. Focus on this multifaceted terrain 
highlights the importance of structural factors that underlie socioeconomic conditions 
thus influencing expectations on the conflict-development trajectory. A key factor in 
this case is the longstanding structural inequality between Northern and Southern 
Nigeria. There are enduring disparities across a range of development indicators such 
as literacy and poverty headcount. In 2013 literacy was at 36% for women, 65% for 
men in the North and 82% for women and 91% for men in the South. In the same 
year, poverty headcount was at 42.4% in the North and 23% in the South.7  
 
In essence this paper reconsiders established understandings of how insecurity can 
impact on development particularly ‘non-security’ elements with a focus on the 
economy.8 It thus builds on the work of Fukuda-Parr et al in providing a critical 
examination of the impact of violent conflict with attention to the ways in which 
economic outcomes can and do negate established assumptions, particularly with 
spatial variations.9  This paper presents original analysis that examines robustly the 
cost of North-East Nigeria’s conflict on development by considering interactions with 
the economy at the national and subnational levels. The review of the developmental 
consequences of conflict concerns a broader remit than economic development. 
However, this paper gives special focus to economic developmental impact because 
of the contemporaneity of the conflict. It is especially difficult to assess the social and 
human capital costs associated with violent conflict in the shorter term.10 
 
Assessing the consequences of conflict raises serious challenges. Stewart highlights 
the methodological problems that are linked to establishing counterfactuals as well as 
the particularity of developing contexts that are often subjected to competing 
exogenous challenges such as debt crises.11  She suggests these might be mitigated to 
a limited degree by comparative studies. However, this approach can undermine the 
peculiarities that define conflict contexts across space, time and indeed issue. Cramer 
underscores this need for case-study approaches because conflicts differ immensely in 
intensity, geographical spread, duration among a range of critical factors that will 
define their impacts. 12 This paper carries out its analysis based on secondary data 
drawn from national and international sources at the level of the national economy. At 
the level of the subnational economy it uses primary data drawn from fieldwork 
undertaken in 2014 and 2015, as part of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa study on the Sahel region, alongside secondary data from national and 
international sources. 13 
 
This paper provides a new and detailed interpretation of the economic consequences 
of conflict at national and subnational levels in a significant and topical terrain. 
Cramer argues that the key challenge with cost of war exercises is the tendency to 
assume that these are static contexts where it is possible to identify variables for 
measuring loss. 14 This paper challenges these tendencies to linearity, particularly at 
the aggregate level. It does so by problematising established thinking on the 
consequences of conflict with a multifaceted examination of development outcomes 
that is cognisant of ongoing dynamics in the wider economy. Luckham et al have long 
noted that insufficient attention is given to the intra-national variations in the impact 
of conflict.15 This paper addresses this gap in its reflection on impacts at the national 
and subnational level. The approaches and arguments proffered provide a valuable 
starting point for interrogating other spaces. This is especially due to a focus on 
privileging particularities alongside robust examination of established patterns of 
understanding conflict-development trajectories.  To this end the paper analyses how 
the Boko Haram-led conflict may or may not have shaped economic developmental 
outcomes at national and subnational levels over the period of 2009-2017. 
 
The paper has five parts. Following this introduction, the second section reflects on 
the debates that have driven thinking on the analyses of developmental consequences 
of conflict and how these inform analysis of the country case across national and 
subnational levels. The third section of the paper undertakes a discussion on the 
Nigeria case with consideration of the developmental consequences of conflict across 
periods. The fourth section examines classical arguments on the macro level impact of 
conflict vis-à-vis empirical realities in the Nigerian economy, using secondary data. 
The fifth section considers the developmental impact of conflict at the level of the 
subnational economy with examination of primary and secondary data. The final 
section concludes the paper. It finds that while evidence suggests a dichotomy in 
terms of the impact of the conflict at the national and subnational levels of the 
economy, there remains a degree of interconnectedness across these strata that is 
influenced by both domestic and international political economy dynamics. 
 
 
 
Debates on analysing the developmental consequences of conflict 
 
Comprehending the causes and impacts of violent conflict has been a central driver 
towards a level of interdisciplinarity across the fields of security and development. 
Cramer notes the, initially tentative and later assertive, foray of development 
economics into conflict studies. 16In spite of some methodological tensions between 
orthodox liberal economics and political economy approaches, he acknowledges the 
advances that have been underscored by the value of such interdisciplinarity.  
 
To be sure there are attendant concerns with privileging economic issues that risk 
reinforcing economic determinism in analyses of conflict-affected contexts. It is thus 
important to consider the economic impact of conflict as closely intertwined with the 
social and political factors that attend the occurrence of civil conflict. Francis has 
argued that conflict (and its associated economic costs) is imbued with social, cultural 
and historical factors that have been refined by domestic and international politics.17 
Although this paper focuses on economic concerns, it does so cognisant of the 
challenges that this presents particularly in accounting for how the social, political 
and economic spheres are defined, and sustained by one another.   
 
Along these lines, interactions between climate variability, conflict and 
socioeconomic outcomes are an important consideration for the study. In the North-
East links have been made between climate variability, economic development 
fallouts and the occurrence of conflict. The United Nations draws attention to the 
connections across ‘underdevelopment, poor governance and poverty’ with climate 
change vis-à-vis the desertification of Lake Chad as an element in both the cause of 
and response to the conflict.18  
 
Drawing on field research, Nwokeoma and Chinedu find links across climate 
variability, declines in agricultural production, insurgent activities and wider 
criminality in the North-East.19 These links are emphasised in the dis-incentivisation 
of young people’s engagement with agricultural activity due to adverse effects of 
climate change such as loss of farmland, upsurges in crop diseases and pests and 
reduced access to water. These can be viewed as ways through which the impact of 
climate change on conflict may undermine reconstruction and the rebuilding of the 
agricultural sector. It is however important to see these factors as part of a context that 
is complex and dynamic across time and issue.20 This lens is important for 
understanding the complexity of attributing causality along the conflict-development 
trajectory in analysis of the conflict-affected agricultural sector in the North-East. 
 
Analyses of the economic impact of conflict tend to focus on aggregate national level 
dynamics.21 Yet the complexity of the types of conflict, i.e. interstate or intrastate, as 
well as the targets of violence are factors that are definitive to the ways in which 
reverberations are felt at national and indeed subnational levels. For instance, Addison 
et al chronicle how different types of conflict lead to varied impacts on the financial 
sector in national and subnational contexts. This is key to the paper’s analysis of the 
disaggregated impact of conflict on development.  
 
Focus on the national level may limit the analysis of conflict contexts in other ways 
also. It risks disaggregation from the complex global political economy. Yet dynamics 
in that space impinge extensively upon the domestic sphere. Mustapha argues that the 
conflict in the North-East has been fueled in part by the region’s disadvantage vis-à-
vis the South on account of key global development policy regimes that have 
advocated a reduced role for the public sector thus undermining its dominant  small-
scale agricultural sector.22 Willett shows that the interactions between conflict and 
development outcomes must be situated within these realities.23 This is a critical 
argument that challenges the tendency to underplay the global dynamics that inform 
the pre-conflict economic conditions that integrate unequally the developing world 
into the global economy. In turn, these structure the ways in which conflict impacts 
negatively on economic developmental outcomes. In the end the risk is that attempts 
at reconstruction do not engage sufficiently the subjugation of the periphery to the 
powers of global capital at the core. This perspective is important for analysing the 
relative impact of the conflict at national and subnational levels of the economy.   
 
On the theme of the positionality of Africa within the global political economy, 
Zeleza’ draws on historicisation as significant for grasping the ways in which the 
developmental costs of conflict are systemically embedded across conflict periods in 
Africa.24 Mazrui in the same volume, highlights continuities between colonial and 
post-colonial wars to evidence the long-lasting costs of wars that have defined Africa 
and its relationship with the global political economy.25 The reality of disadvantaged 
contexts becoming further entrenched in unequal patterns for long periods due to the 
developmental costs of conflict is a point of note. This argument is especially 
pertinent given the historical disadvantage of the North-East vis-à-vis the national 
economy in Nigeria and the potential impact of the conflict on reinforcing extant 
disparities. 
 
The World Bank is clear on how conflict compromises economic growth and 
stagnates human development indicators. 26 Fukuda-Parr et al and Lopez and Wodon 
note that the short-run economic impact of conflict is especially pronounced in the 
casualty levels, displacement and destruction of physical capital which can have 
immediate repercussions on production, trade and output levels. 27 Loss of life and 
displacement have a clear impact on labour and livelihoods and can disrupt domestic 
and international trade patterns. Ksoll et al find evidence for this in their study on the 
economic impact of the post-election violence on the Kenyan flower export 
industry.28 Displacement can also be inimical to economic activity.  In her study on 
Bosnia, Kondylis finds that it can negatively impact on economic outcomes as it 
increases levels of unemployment and underemployment particularly in contexts with 
high levels of informality of the economy. 29 These dynamics are central to the 
reflections on the impact of conflict on development at the subnational level with 
regard to how displacement impacts on farming households and agricultural 
production in North-East Nigeria.  
 
At the macro level violent conflict can drive the diversion of financial resources into 
defence spending and result in disinvestment in hitherto development priorities. 
Fukuda-Parr et al highlight that spending is diverted from productive activities that 
drive socioeconomic change in developing contexts. Stewart notes that social 
spending is not necessarily always impacted negatively while Azam notes that 
productive investment is undermined. 30 This is especially pertinent considering the 
widespread infrastructural destruction that attends conflict and insecurity. Fukuda-
Parr et al allude to how this constitutes a longer-term developmental cost for 
dominant economic sectors such as agriculture and commerce. 31 Gupta et al point out 
that such fiscal adjustment can lead to lower investment and yet higher inflation and 
reduced growth.32 It is notable that the higher value capital sectors can be at particular 
risk as a result of conflict. The argument is made that capital-intensive sectors are 
most undermined as a result of conflict with low technology agriculture presented as 
war-invulnerable.33  These points are important in the examination of the conflict 
impact at the macro level of the economy particularly as regards conflict-induced 
diversion of public spending. 
 
Analysis is extended to terrorism-affected contexts with economic impacts such as 
declines in GDP growth and the redirection of investment from the private to the 
public sector.34 Diaddario argues that armed conflict can undermine economic 
development by disrupting trade patterns and limiting exports. 35 In their study on 
conflict in the Spanish Basque country, Abadie and Gardeazabal note that insecurity 
can impact negatively on foreign direct investment (FDI), with implications at both 
the national and subnational levels depending on contextual factors.36 Lopez and 
Wodon highlight the risks of reduced foreign investment in lower savings and 
technology transfer as a result of conflict in the African context.37 This is an important 
consideration in analysis of the impact of conflict on development at the macro level. 
This is because of the relatively high degree of trade and FDI integration of Nigeria 
within the global economy vis-à-vis other African economies owing to reliance on 
mineral exports. 38 The detrimental impact on trade and FDI also emerges as a 
significant factor at the subnational level given high levels of uncertainty and 
increased transaction costs. 
 
Violent conflict can have wider economic costs across geographical spaces. This is 
especially so in Sub-Saharan Africa where national borders are porous as a result of 
longstanding trade and migration patterns. Lopez and Wodon argue that reduced 
regional trade can undermine regional growth as a result of negative spillovers from 
conflict. 39 The World Bank found that Tanzania suffered GDP growth losses of 7% 
as a result of trade losses due to violent conflict in the region.40 This study focuses on 
the country case of Nigeria however reflections on conflict impact at the subnational 
level of the economy reveal that displacement has consequences for production and 
trade in the wider Sahel region.41  
 
The growth of literature on economic costs and consequences of conflict is dominated 
by methodological approaches that rely exclusively on formal models as a basis for 
analytical inferences about lines of causality. Cramer has argued that this is a flawed 
basis for such analyses due to the unreliability of socioeconomic data in the African 
context particularly in conflict-affected and fragile contexts.42 This literature has 
tended also to abstract from historical factors as well as the global political economy 
and how the associated core-periphery dynamic influences the impact of conflict on 
economic outcomes in the Global South.  However, it is necessary to reflect 
comprehensively on the economic costs of conflicts with all the relevant contextual 
factors across time to build effective post-conflict peacebuilding interventions.   
 
Fukuda-Parr et al note the immense complexity that attends analyses of the economic 
and developmental consequences of violent conflict. From a survey of 22 countries in 
Africa, they highlight that the economic costs can and do vary within national 
borders. 43They also provide evidence that suggests that while some countries present 
classical outcomes of conflict such as lower GDP growth levels, some others 
including Sudan, Chad, Senegal and Ethiopia experienced stable GDP growth over 
the conflict period. Some factors are noted as underscoring these economic outcomes 
including the geographical isolation of conflict and the significance of mineral 
resource bases that appear to be unaffected by insecurity. The reality of the complex 
and contradictory developmental outcomes that can attend the occurrence of conflict 
is expounded upon reflection on the impact of conflict in Nigeria across space and 
time. 
 
 
 
The case of Nigeria 
 
Nigeria presents a fertile terrain for interrogating links between violent conflict and 
development. Its experiences across time have yielded highly contextualised 
interactions with the economy. In the immediate post-independence period, over 
1967-1970, the erstwhile regional government of the Eastern region of Nigeria 
prosecuted civil war against the Nigerian state in an attempt at secession. This was 
precipitated by a military coup and a counter coup that resulted from underlying 
socioeconomic, political and ethnic fissures that had been exacerbated by the 
dynamics of British colonialism.  
 
The start of the conflict coincided with economic growth levels on a downward spiral 
to -15.77% in 1967.44 However, this progressed at an exponential rate to reach 25% in 
1970.45 This outcome was linked to the fact that outside of a short period at the start 
of the war, the Nigerian government maintained control of oil production with foreign 
support especially from the former colonial power, UK.46 As a result even though 
production fell from 415,000 barrels to 142,000 barrels over 1966-1967 it then 
increased almost ten-fold to 1,080,000 barrels by 1970.47 In the end this capacity 
expansion alongside major increases in oil prices, proved critical to major gains in 
state-led industrial, agricultural and social infrastructural investments through the 
1970s. In fact Schatz notes that the civil war stimulated industrial production through 
forced innovations that were due to import restrictions during the conflict.48 This 
outcome is in line with Stewart’s assertion on the greater level of economic efficiency 
that was experienced by some countries in Europe after the Second World War.49 
 
Moving to another major conflict in a more contemporary context, the Niger Delta 
region has been subject to conflict around contestations over ownership and access to 
the resources, economic losses in agriculture, indigenous exclusion from industrial 
activity and environmental damage that is generated from the oil resources located in 
the region but utilised across Nigeria. 50 These frustrations found expression in the 
morphing of civil society responses into insurgency that targeted multinational oil 
corporations and the Nigerian state.51  
 
The conflict has had clear ramifications for oil production activities and therein the 
national economy. The activities of militants, particularly in attacks on oil 
installations and pipelines, resulted in immense disruptions to Nigeria’s oil 
production. These were estimated to have led to losses of between 25% and 40% of 
total production and exports between late 2005 and 2009.52 The production shutdown 
coincided with a fall in exports as a proportion of GDP from 43% in 2006 to 30% in 
2009.53 Oil production is essential to this outcome because petroleum exports 
constituted between 90%-96% of merchandise exports over the same period.54 This 
revenue source is highly significant for the Nigerian state that relies heavily on oil 
resources for public revenue; in 2013, public revenue from oil proceeds stood at 
75%.55 
 
Returning to this paper’s case study, the conflict in North-Eastern Nigeria has been 
underscored by the actions of the militant Islamist group known widely as Boko 
Haram against the Nigerian state and wider society with some attention to 
commercial, ethnic as well as religious targets and gendered implications for affected 
communities. The group has deployed terror tactics as well as guerrilla warfare 
towards the Nigerian state that has led also to its occupation of national territory.56 
The state has also responded with levels of brutality that have at times put civilian 
populations at great risk and deepened the instability felt by communities.57 Boko 
Haram’s stated motivations are best described as a rejection of Western incursions on 
culture, particularly a form of Islamic culture in the African context.58 But the conflict 
has been linked to root causes in a sense of deprivation that is evidenced by poor 
human development indicators.59 In addition, Mohammed has argued that the state-
deployed structural adjustment programmes that heightened poverty and 
unemployment, especially among young Nigerians, is a key underlying factor in the 
conflict.60  
  
This conflict is emblematic of the times. It reinforces notions of fragility as being on a 
spectrum where some states appear to be on the brink of collapse with others 
exhibiting a level of resilience and yet facing immense vulnerability.61 This latter 
designation has come to define the Nigerian context since the escalation of the Niger 
Delta conflict from the mid-2000s to the current crisis in the North since 2009. The 
actions of Boko Haram are especially pertinent in the post 9/11 global security 
discourse where violent extremism underscored by fundamentalism along religious 
lines has fed into an anti-terror frenzy. As such, this conflict along with others in the 
Sahel and the Middle East are considered especially challenging to global security 
concerns. The conflict is characterised also by its containment to Northern Nigeria so 
that while its impact is felt in neighbouring countries including Cameroon and Chad, 
its reverberation is limited in the wider national context.  
 
Given that the conflict is ongoing there is limited research reflecting on its economic 
consequences. Eme and Ibietan highlight the costs at the level of the macroeconomy 
in FDI losses to the tune of 1.33 trillion Naira and prospective FDI inflows.62 
However, they focus extensively on the economic costs felt within the North-East 
region in destruction of infrastructure, intra- African and local trade patterns, loss of 
life and displacement as undermining labour market dynamics, disruption to local 
tourism and transport enterprise. Most significantly they draw attention to the 
conundrum of the coexistence of the conflict with economic dynamism in the South. 
Oladimeji and Oresanwo focus on the immediate impacts on the rising costs of doing 
business in affected regions with regard to increased risk and associated insurance 
costs. 63 Osumah echoes this by highlighting the conflict’s impact on disruption to 
foreign and local investment due to both perceived instability and the associated 
paralysis of support services particularly in air transportation.64 This assertion may be 
linked also to the alleged change in tactic by Boko Haram splinter group, Ansaru, in 
the kidnappings of foreigners as acts of terror.65 
 
Tamba notes the difficulty in computing the economic costs of the conflict as it is 
ongoing.66 Nonetheless he acknowledges the anticipated economic impact in the 
diversion of public spending from productive investment to defence and security 
reinforcements, potential decrease in consumption and negative impacts on 
production.67 The most insightful contribution here is on the disruption of intra-
regional trade and business enterprise. For Nigeria and Cameroon, the increased 
border security is likely to reduce trade in goods and services.68 In addition, given the 
insecurity across borders there are delays to regional infrastructural projects such as 
the Chad-Cameroonian railway with likely implications for trade and business 
patterns.69  
 
These papers offer some useful reflections on a highly dynamic subject. As expected 
the extent of evidence- based examination is limited given the contemporaneous 
context being addressed. Against this background, this paper progresses this small and 
growing literature by offering a  detailed and evidence-based interrogation of the 
developmental costs of this conflict driven by a critical analysis of generalised 
assumptions about the consequences of violent conflict regarding this case study. 
 
Interrogating the developmental impact and indeed causes of conflict is a discourse 
that is driven by attempts to delineate emergent patterns and enhance generalisable 
research outcomes. This has led to the widespread use of cross-country studies as an 
evidence base to bolster the generalisability of research outcomes from classic 
reflections on conflict and development outcomes to latter focus on terrorism in this 
regard.70 Cramer called for studies that would provide more thorough insights to the 
nature of the consequence of conflict with specific reference to a broader set of 
methodological approaches.71 Special mention is made of case studies as these 
provide greater specificity given that all wars are not alike in their causes, intensity, 
spatial spread and institutional characteristics. Serneels and Verporten note also the 
cross-country results are fragile as these barely consider the particularities of conflict 
typologies and are biased towards middle and high-income economies due to data 
availability.72  In essence context is everything. 
 
This assertion has informed the paper’s focus on the complex context that is Nigeria. 
Case study analysis allows for a more nuanced interrogation of the realities that have 
attended violent conflict. This is especially reinforced in the subnational focus on the 
Boko Haram-led conflict in the North-East.  With some attention to the differential 
impact of conflict at the subnational level, Sandler and Enders assert that more 
economically diverse economies may exhibit greater resilience.73 Yet until the 2015 
decline in petroleum prices the resource-dependent Nigerian economy bucked this 
trend. It exhibited high growth rates driven by its dominant petroleum sector directly 
and indirectly through the buoyancy of related service sectors including finance.  
There has been extensive focus on interactions between conflict, entrenched poverty 
and reduced growth based on the methodological analysis that focuses on the 
individual as the referent object. Comprehending the impact of conflict in Nigeria 
must be cognisant of the complex social dynamics that determine, to an extent, the 
experiences of individuals in particular contexts. Development outcomes vary widely 
across Nigeria and have done so especially across the geographic divide of North and 
South. As such the economic developmental impact of conflict is reliant on 
established intra-national development patterns.  
 
Against this background the next section engages critically with generalised 
assumptions on the developmental consequences of conflict in relation to the national 
economy in Nigeria. However it does so cognisant of the noted complexities, 
especially the influence of dynamics within the global economy. As shall be seen the 
analysis reveals that in many respects the economic impact of the conflict has been 
isolated to the North with limited incursions on the macro economy. This outcome is 
informed also by the degree of integration of the economy at the macro level with the 
global sphere vis-à-vis the subnational sphere. The disparate effect of insecurity at 
these levels is an important consideration given that it is potentially influential to the 
relevant approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
The macro level economic impact of the conflict in North-East Nigeria  
 
This section examines the Nigeria case to consider classical arguments on the 
economic developmental costs of conflict to FDI flows, economic growth, fiscal 
adjustment, trade flows and sectoral dynamics. It examines development indicators at 
the aggregate national level against the intensification of the conflict in North-Eastern 
Nigeria.  
 
Analyses of the impact of conflict on the macroeconomy have focused on the diversion 
of productive investment from developmental concerns such as infrastructural 
investment to shorter-term priorities such as defence spending. Adebakin et al show 
that the exponential increases in public expenditure on defence and security displace 
public expenditure on human development budgetary components including health, 
education and agriculture.74 It is challenging to assess security expenditure towards 
addressing the Boko Haram-induced violence. In Figures 1 and 2, focus is on budgetary 
spending for defence and internal security but this underreports the comprehensive 
public expenditure in this sphere. For instance, the stated budget allocation neither 
covers comprehensively related expenditure from the Office of the National Security 
Advisor within the Presidency nor the Joint Multinational Task Force, a regional body 
that comprises forces from Cameroon, Niger, Benin, Chad and Nigeria, operating under 
the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission with support from the African 
Union.75 Yet in 2015, former National Security Adviser Colonel Dasuki received extra-
budgetary funds of 2 billionn USD for arms procurement for the military to address the 
Boko Haram-led insurgency. 76 
 
 
Figure 1-Recurrent expenditure as a proportion of total recurrent expenditure % 
  
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Yearbook 2015 
 
Defence and internal security expenditure rose from about 13% to 20% from 2009 to 
2012 then declined to 15% in 2013 before a renewed rise until 2015. The rising trend 
is in line with classic expectations on security related spending.   
 
 
 
Figure 2- Capital expenditure as a proportion of total capital expenditure % 
 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Government Finance Statistics 
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Arguments about the crowding effect of increased security spending relate to public 
investment which is best reflected by capital expenditure in Figure 2. From here defence 
and security expenditure rose by about 3% to 10% in 2010 before continuing on a rising 
trend. In contrast public investment in productive sectors, agriculture, manufacturing, 
mining and quarrying as well as transport and communications have declined over 
2009-2015. For agriculture, transport and communications the declines in capital 
expenditure exceed those of recurrent expenditure. This supports the argument by 
Gupta et al in that fiscal adjustments of this nature will lead to lower investment.77  
 
However, capital expenditure on roads and construction has increased exponentially. 
Because of the absence of a system of building and construction statistics in Nigeria it 
is challenging to undertake a robust analysis of this outcome.78 Nonetheless, linkages 
have been made between Nigeria’s, until recently, buoyant growth rate, ascending oil 
prices and FDI net inflows, especially from emerging economies, and growth of 
expenditure in the construction sector in patterns mirroring Middle Eastern oil 
producers.79 The public sector and therein public capital expenditure is a central driver 
of the subsector because of limited indigenous private capital capacity for large scale 
construction projects.80 This outcome reveals the limited impact of the conflict on the 
construction subsector at the national level of the economy. 
 
Stewart has argued that security expenditure can be expected to rise in conflict contexts 
alongside a decline in social and economic spending and especially so on capital.81 It 
is difficult to be certain about the extent of correlation between the increased investment 
in security vis-à-vis reduced investment in the productive and social sectors. However, 
the expenditure in social infrastructure, education, follows a similar pattern to security 
expenditure. Health is largely static with a slight increase later. Stewart has shown also 
that increased security expenditure does not always displace expenditure in social 
infrastructure, particularly in wealthier economies that exhibit increased spending on 
security. 82  The decline in investment in the productive sectors is of particular 
significance given the extensive damage in these spheres that has resulted from the 
conflict.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3- Annual GDP Growth in Nigeria % 
  
 
 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2016 
 
 
Debates on the developmental costs of conflict at the level of the macro economy point 
to a negative impact on aggregate production.84 In 2014 the then Finance Minister, Dr 
Okonjo Iweala suggested an expected decline to GDP growth as a result of the Boko 
Haram insurgency. 85  However, the Deputy Governor of Nigeria’s Central Bank, 
reported that macroeconomic policy, including monetary policy, was unaffected by the 
conflict.86 GDP growth was on a downward trend over 2011 to 2013 from 7.8% to 4 % 
before recovering to 6.3% in 2015 (see Figure 3). The downward trend has been 
described as reflective of the longstanding challenges of the dilapidated state of 
infrastructure and the reliance on the oil sector.87 While neither of these outcomes was 
helped by the destruction of sparse infrastructure or agricultural activity in the North-
East, it has been difficult to reduce them to resulting directly from the conflict. Rather 
a more significant link is put forward in the global financial crisis of 2008 through 
reduced capital flows and fall in petroleum demand.88 In fact the modest recovery in 
growth between 2013 and 2014 accompanied the intensification of the conflict. 
Furthermore, decline in GDP growth to 2.7% post-2015 coincided with major advances 
by the military and recovery of territory from the Boko Haram insurgents.89  
 
Figure 4- Exports of goods and services as % of GDP 
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Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2016 
 
 
Violent conflict is expected to destabilise trade indicators and this is seen as most 
pronounced in export volumes and growth. The underlying mechanisms for this 
outcome include the diversion of inputs towards security needs as well as disruption of 
labour and production activities and therein available supply for export. 90  Export 
performance in Nigeria has been on a declining trend that has indeed deepened since 
the intensification of the conflict (See Figure 4). In addition, agricultural exports have 
declined as a proportion of merchandise exports. 91  This could be considered as 
significant given the sectoral decline in capital expenditure that coincided with 
increased security spending discussed earlier. Nonetheless the reality of the negligible 
agricultural exports base in Nigeria suggests that movements in export flows are not 
linked decisively to challenges within the agricultural sector.92 
 
Figure 5 -Oil prices and FDI net inflows ( BoP, current USD) 
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Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2016 and OPEC Basket Prices 
 
 
FDI net inflows in Nigeria have been on a declining trend since 2009. As noted earlier, 
insecurity and resulting economic instability have been cited as causal factors driving 
decline in investment flows. This argument has also been proffered with regard to 
Nigeria.93  As the conflict has progressed, FDI net inflows have fallen from highs of 
8.8bn USD in 2011 to just over 3bn USD in 2015 as FDI as a proportion of GDP 
declined steeply from 5% in 2009 to under 2% in 2010 (See Figures 5 and 6). This 
suggests a negative impact of the conflict on the inflow of foreign investment given the 
precipitous declining trend.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 -Oil prices and FDI net inflows as a proportion of GDP %   
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While the negative impact of the conflict is a feasible argument other factors compound 
assumptions about causality. For instance, the global financial crisis has also been 
linked to a fall in FDI as a proportion of GDP. Its impact has been felt extensively in 
Nigeria as well as across Africa. 94  The immediate aftermath of the global crisis 
coincides with an initial dip in FDI as a proportion of GDP from 2009 (See Figure 6). 
Even with these challenges Nigeria has remained a primary destination for FDI in 
Africa in spite of the conflict.95  
 
Another point of note is that FDI in Nigeria is dominated by the petroleum sector and 
thus associated factors including oil prices and investment decisions of oil majors have 
also influenced flows. Initial recovery in FDI net inflows from 2010 to 2012 
corresponds to gains in oil prices over the same period from 77 USD to 109 USD (See 
Figure 5). The subsequent declines in FDI net inflows correlates with movements in oil 
prices and the consequent volatility in the Naira. FDI movements have been influenced 
also by production challenges in the Niger Delta. In an emerging pattern of transition a 
consortium of foreign oil majors divested a bulk of onshore interests valued at 5 billion 
USD to largely indigenous private capital in 2014 as a result of longstanding oil 
bunkering activities, conflict and security concerns in the Niger Delta.96 These realities 
problematise narrow conclusions based on linear readings of the multifaceted 
dynamics. While the conflict in the North-East may have hampered investor confidence 
it by no means presents a certain line of causality.  
 
The evidence suggests that movements in the global economy have had a more 
fundamental developmental impact on the economy at the national level than the 
conflict in the North-East. This is quite unlike the impact of the insurgency in the Niger 
Delta region given that the oil producing region is at the centre of Nigeria’s 
interconnectedness to the international sphere. A key factor for this seeming localised 
impact is potentially the limited integration of production and output at subnational 
level of the economy with the wider Nigerian economy vis-à-vis the global economy. 
Against this background, the next section considers the developmental impact of the 
conflict at the subnational level with reference to North-Eastern Nigeria.  
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 The economic impact of the conflict on North-East Nigeria 
 
This section considers the dynamics that have shaped the developmental consequences 
of the conflict within the North-East. Fukuda-Parr et al show that violent conflict can 
have differential impacts at the national and subnational levels.97 As such it is important 
to consider the disaggregated effects of violent conflict. Stewart proposes that indeed 
one of the challenges of comprehending the costs of violent conflict in disadvantaged 
contexts is the isolation of initial conditions that predate instability.98 This is pertinent 
particularly for North-East Nigeria.  
 
Understanding the context: Initial conditions in the North-East 
 
Conflict affected North-East Nigeria comprises: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, 
Taraba and Yobe states although Adamawa, Borno and Yobe are considered the worst 
affected.99 Northern Nigeria suffers higher poverty across a range of measurement 
modes. North-East Nigeria has very high rates of poverty averaging 70% as against the 
national average of 61% (see Table 1).  High poverty and inequality, especially across 
the North-South divide have been considered triggers for the conflict. 100  The 
substantially lower rates of GDP per capita as well as higher levels of poverty vis-à-vis 
the national averages evidence this reality (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Socio economic indicators for North-East Nigeria  
 
 GDP 
(PPP) 
Billions 
USD 2007 
GDP per 
capita 
USD 2007  
Unemployment 
rate 2011 (%) 
Dollar per 
day based 
on an 
adjusted 
PPP Poor 
(%) 2010 
 
Adamawa 4.6  1,417  33.8  74.3   
Bauchi 4.7  983 41.4  73.1   
Borno 5.2  1,214  29.1  55.1   
Gombe 2.5  1,036 38.7 74.2  
Taraba 3.4  1,446  12.7  68.9  
Yobe  2.0  843 35.6  74.1  
Nigeria 627.9 1,822 23.9 61.2  
 
Source: Nigeria Data Portal (2017); NBS (2012);101 World Bank World Development 
Indicators (2017) 
 
 
Indeed, considerations of horizontal inequality vis-à-vis the North-South divide are 
central to understanding the conflict context, but so is vertical inequality. Across 
Nigeria, inequality within-state is higher than the national average of .447 (2010) in 
only six out of 36 states, including both Taraba and Yobe states.102 These states had the 
highest increases in inequality from 2004 to 2010. High levels of inequality in the 
region  have historical rooting in colonial structures that served to privilege the 
aristocracy in terms of access to formal education and political power.103 These have 
also been cited as a conflict trigger with former Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, 
criticising the ‘conspicuous consumption and opulence of the Western educated elite’ 
amidst abject poverty.104 The concentration of the economic impact of the conflict in 
rural and agriculturally active areas is also an important dimension to consider.  In 
Nigeria, rural poverty levels far exceed urban poverty levels at 52.1 % vis-à-vis 34.1% 
(2010). 105  Such substantial levels of poverty are telling of the effects of reduced 
economic activity to the material welfare of those affected. 
 
In the North-East, male employment is dominated by agriculture followed by 
commerce while the pattern is reversed for female employment.  106 The Presidential 
Initiative on the North-East (PINE) presents agricultural employment as prevalent and 
constituting  up to 80% of total employment in the pre-conflict period.107 The extent of 
employment vulnerability in the region is broad. Unemployment rates in North-East 
Nigeria are some of the highest nationally for Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, 
Taraba and Yobe States averaging 31.8% especially when considered against the 
national average of 23.9% (See Table 1).108 This is an important factor that speaks to 
the troubled conditions within the region. According to Nigerian Institute of Social and 
Economic Research (NISER), youth unemployment in largely rural areas, as is much 
of the North-East, rose from 47.6% to 53.2% from 2010 to 2012. 109  Given the 
demographic of the main participants in the conflict these data are significant for 
comprehending the context of the upheavals.  
 
The final point of note is on the perceived economic contribution of the region to the 
national economy. Table 1 shows that the North-East, which comprises six out of 36 
states, constitutes 3.5% of the total GDP of the Nigerian economy. As has been seen, 
the economic impact of the conflict to the wider Nigeria is not defined solely by 
contribution in this regard. Yet, it is necessary to reflect on the urgency or lack thereof 
that has attended its resolution due to its relative containment to the region both 
spatially and socioeconomically. The public expenditure response of the Nigerian state 
to the conflict beyond movements in defence spending are delineable from the budget 
allocation to PINE. In 2017, budget allocation to PINE stood at 45 billion Naira of a 
total budget of 7.4 trillion Naira as compared to 175.7 billion Naira covering allocations 
to the Federal Ministry of The Niger Delta, Presidential Amnesty Programme and the 
Niger Delta Development Commission to the economically essential Niger Delta 
region.110 However, it is important to note that the Niger Delta is considered to have 
suffered longstanding neglect by the state until the 2000s. 
 
Pre-conflict North-Eastern Nigeria is characterised by agriculture and commerce.111 
The region is largely rural with 75% arable land supporting agriculture defined by crop 
production and to a lesser extent animal husbandry.112 Both cash crops and food crops 
are produced in a wide range that includes millet, sorghum, cowpeas, rice, sugarcane, 
cotton, groundnuts, gum Arabic and ginger.113 There is some potential for irrigation 
due to proximity to rivers and swampy areas that are resourced by Lake Chad.114 
Animal husbandry is dominated by pastoralist communities with Fulani herdsmen 
rearing cattle alongside poultry production which is limited to urban and peri-urban 
settings.115 Agricultural production is a main link between the regional economy and 
the wider Nigerian economy. First, it is a source of agricultural exports both within 
Africa (to the Sahel) and to Asia, Europe and the United States.116 Second, it is a major 
source of food to the rest of the Nigerian economy.  In particular, grain, pulses, cotton, 
groundnuts, poultry and cattle are traded from the North to the South of Nigeria.117   
 
There are extended and interrelated economic, social and geographical factors that 
influence the realities of agriculture in the region. First, there is limited access to 
significant inputs such as fertilisers regardless of price levels as well as storage 
capacities for smoothing out production surpluses and gluts. 118  Second, market 
conditions such as access to global markets have influenced negatively production of 
certain cash crops including groundnuts and cotton in the region.119 Third, as mentioned 
earlier in the paper, climate variability can limit crop production. This is especially 
prominent in the extreme North-East, i.e. Borno and Yobe States due to desertification 
and low rainfall in the absence of irrigation. 120  Fourth, the interaction between 
sedentary farmers and pastoralists is driven by longstanding contestations that have 
arisen around land access, use and ownership patterns. These agitations have 
manifested along ethno-religious lines across Northern Nigeria and are exacerbated by 
drought and have been therein linked to climate variability within the Sahel. 121 
However tensions between settler and pastoralist communities  in 2016-2017 have been 
connected also directly to the activities of Boko Haram. Notably, the conflict is seen as 
limiting available grazing lands (due to increased risks of cattle theft) in the North that 
forces migration further southwards.122 
 
Commerce and trade are significant economic activities in the region. These are linked 
in part to the national and international trade of agricultural goods. The region has been 
an international and national trading hub with its notable cattle and grains market in 
Potiskum, Yobe state and the Monday Market and Baga Market in Borno State.123 
These activities are significant also for the wider Sahel region. For instance, imports 
and exports from the wider Sahel play an important role in mitigating agricultural 
production disruptions.124 Petty trade has been important for livelihoods as well as 
being a form of pluriactivity and source of non-farm income for agricultural 
households.125 There is substantial reliance also on commerce and trade, especially 
petty trading (often casual and highly vulnerable) in peri-urban settings with a strong 
presence of women.126  
 
As with agricultural production, broader factors influence the operation of commerce 
and trade across Nigeria including in the North-East. Porter et al have shown how trade 
and commerce can constitute a source of instability due to underlying social tensions 
such as those across ethnic lines in Northern Nigeria. 127  Yet they underscore the 
complexity that characterises this setting by highlighting the resilience of group 
dynamics in communities that can counter such issues. These include supportive 
relationships between cattle dealers in Northern and South-West Nigeria as well as 
between Northern and Southern traders in Northern markets during heightened ethno-
religious tensions. 128 
 
Examining the impact of conflict on North-East Nigeria on agriculture and commerce 
 
This section analyses the impact of conflict on the agricultural sector, trade and 
commercial activities since the conflict, especially following its escalation from 2014. 
Stewart et al argue that disruption to the agricultural sector in conflict occurs 
particularly where displacement affects labour activities.129 More than 80% of the rural 
North-East relies on agricultural production and its economy is defined by the 
agricultural sector.130 As of January 2017 UNOCHA reported the displacement of 1.8 
million people from the North-East with over 200,000 people in neighbouring countries 
including Niger, Cameroon and Chad. 131 The vast majority of displacement due to the 
conflict occurred in 2014. Estimates suggest that up to 6000 farming households have 
been displaced as a result of the conflict. 132  Alongside widespread destruction of 
physical and social infrastructure, conflict-related displacement is noted as diminishing 
cultivation, driving food scarcity and decreased functioning of markets thus leading to 
escalating food prices.133 
 
The conflict has limited access to significant farm inputs as well as farmlands. An 
emerging challenge is the suspected use of land mines. Evidence suggests that there 
have been disruptions to agricultural activities in Southern Borno due to the fear of the 
presence of land mines.134 FAO report a ‘lack of access to seeds, farming tools, land 
and water among other factors.’135 They note also damage to agricultural systems in 
both the formal and informal seed systems in the North-East. There is disruption to 
production patterns especially of staple and cash crops due to interruption of seasonal 
agricultural practices. As producing communities are unable to cultivate and harvest as 
required there is longstanding damage to farms that undermines agriculture-reliant 
economies.136 It is necessary to note that other factors impact on production outcomes 
in this region not least those relating to climate variability including floods, dry spells 
and pests.137 
 
In 2016 production of staple foods and cash crops were notably below average in two 
of the worst affected states, Borno and Yobe, alongside reduced access to pasture for 
livestock.138 This has wider implications for the functioning of agricultural markets. 
Because of low production levels, stocks are drawn down more rapidly thus placing 
inflationary pressures on prices. This is evidenced by high and rapidly increasing prices 
for staples such as cowpeas, maize and sorghum over 2014 and 2015.139 These are 
compounded by macro-economic factors in the depreciation of the Naira that has made 
food imports more expensive in addition to trade flow challenges due to heightened 
insecurity.140 The risks associated with diminished agricultural production activities 
has implications also for food security in the region. Sikod has been vocal on the dire 
consequences of conflict on food security in Africa.141 Since 2016, reduced production 
is noted as intensifying famine risk across the North-East.142 The FAO notes that 5.1 
million people face severe risks to food security as a result of challenges to agricultural 
production.143 
 
 
Luckham et al propose that the following factors are some of the most salient that shed 
light on the economic costs of conflict at the subnational level: increased uncertainty, 
increased transaction costs and receding of formal economic spaces.144 Heightened 
levels of insecurity have been disruptive to trade flows and led especially to increases 
in transaction costs within the region and intra-nationally. They have also raised the 
risks of retreat of financial activities into less formal spaces and led to the exit of foreign 
investment due to uncertainty. This is in line with arguments proffered by Oladimeji 
and Oresanwo on the rising costs of doing business in affected regions and Osumah on 
disruption to foreign and local investment due to both perceived instability and the 
associated paralysis of support services. 145 
 
 
Trade in agricultural products, the mainstay of this region, has declined as a result of 
insecurity. Key food markets in North-East Nigeria, including Yola, Maiduguri, 
Damaturu, Potiskum and Mubi were functioning at about half of normal capacity with 
most semi-urban markets not operational at all due to security threats in 2014.146 There 
has been a level of recovery in 2016 with markets in parts of Adamawa and Gombe 
returning to usual performance levels. However, many in Mubi and Yola, report 
continuing challenges following the departure of Boko Haram due to increased 
transaction costs from the state security apparatus through road checkpoints and 
associated payments. 147  This supports Tamba’s argument on how increased state 
security provision can undermine trade.148 Higher transaction costs have arisen also 
from the imposition of taxes on local farmers by Boko Haram in and around areas under 
their control.149  
 
 
 Trade routes between the North-East and the South of Nigeria are severely disrupted 
as transportation is now largely diverted through the North West.150 Transport channels 
in and out of the North-East are either destroyed or highly insecure, leading to drops in 
trade-related traffic and major rises in transport costs to the region. For instance, until 
2012 the average transport costs from Lagos to Maiduguri stood at N4000, but this 
increased to over N8000 from 2014 as Boko Haram attacks intensified. Furthermore, 
since 2014 only a small number of transporters continued to use the route.151 These 
realities have contributed to food price hikes in Southern Nigeria.152 Beyond this the 
trade volumes are at far lower quantities, approximately half, of what would normally 
be expected.153 Hence, destruction of transport infrastructure has increased transaction 
costs with implications for the wider economy in food price hikes.   
 
There has been disruption in the organised private sector   resulting from the conflict. 
Insecurity has driven increased armed robberies and forced extortions from local 
businesses to support Boko Haram.154 This has had an impact on commercial services. 
Addison et al highlight the high-risk exposure faced by financial services in conflict.155 
These have been disrupted extensively thus undermining other commercial activities. 
Banking systems and infrastructure have been destroyed in Adamawa state therefore 
limiting cash-relevant transactions.156 More widely, providers have necessarily altered 
the hours of service in response to concerns around security of staff and clientele in the 
region further diminishing service provision.157 These developments can potentially 
shift financially-related activities from the formal into the informal sphere.  
 
Small to medium sized enterprises have suffered with out-migration of businesspersons 
with implications for formal sector enterprise due to heightened uncertainty. This 
exodus has been linked to the relocation of long established foreign capital investments 
to the capital city of Abuja.158  Abadie and Gardeazabal have indeed argued that FDI 
can be impacted by insecurity in ways that are defined by contextual realities.159 The 
North-East presents a particular situation where the impact of the conflict on 
displacement, destruction of infrastructure, reduced access to agricultural inputs, 
uncertainty, transaction costs and receding formal spaces is contained to the region. 
This places potentially a much-disenfranchised region in greater disadvantage to the 
rest of the country.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Examining the economic consequences of conflict in the North-East is a complex 
endeavor due to the intricate and interlinked ways in which various factors influence 
developmental processes and outcomes. This is compounded by the limitations in the 
available data both in terms of their coverage of relevant indicators and quality as 
well as the contemporaneity of the conflict. Nonetheless, preliminary reflections 
suggest a dichotomy in terms of the effect of the conflict at the levels of the national 
and subnational economy. 
 
In general, at the national level, the consequences of the conflict on the economy are 
less directly delineated. Critically interconnected movements in the global economy 
appear to have a major influence on developmental outcomes. To some extent, oil 
price declines as well as the 2008 global economic crisis show a negative relationship 
with FDI flows. It is a similar dynamic for GDP growth. Rather perversely, periods of 
military progress against the insurgency have accompanied declines in growth since 
2015. Because of the dominance of the mineral subsector in merchandise exports, oil 
price movements alongside production disruptions in the Niger Delta are likely to 
have been especially critical for the downturn in exports as a proportion of GDP. 
 
However on fiscal adjustments there have been drastic changes in the pattern of 
public expenditure immediately following the 2009 intensification of the conflict that 
have indeed coincided with reduced public capital spending in productive sectors of 
the economy including agriculture, transport and communications as well as 
manufacturing and mining. Expenditure on construction as well as education has 
bucked the trend in a pattern that reinforces the dichotomy of conflict impact at the 
subnational and national levels of the economy, in the case of the former. On 
education, evidence confirms the argument that social spending does not necessarily 
decline as a result of conflict even with the rise in security-related spending.  
 
Considering the consequences of conflict in the subnational context, is an even more 
complex endeavor.  This is due to the exacerbation of the earlier cited challenges 
within a conflict-affected context as the process of data collation and analysis is 
complicated by security concerns, wider variations in approaches given the range of 
actors as well as a high degree of politicisation. Nonetheless reflections on data from 
primary and secondary sources paint a bleaker picture at the subnational level of the 
economy.  
 
There has been widespread disruption in the main economic activities in the region: 
agriculture, commerce and trade. Agricultural production is in decline with dire 
consequences for food prices, food security and agricultural livelihoods. This is linked 
to the displacement of labour, the destruction of agricultural infrastructure and input 
systems, diminished access to land and farm equipment. These outcomes negate 
Collier’s argument of the invulnerability of low-technology agriculture. It is essential 
to note that the challenges faced by the agricultural sector are not necessarily an 
aberration of the status quo but potentially an exacerbation of extant challenges. This 
applies also to the ways in which climate variability reinforces these outcomes both in 
crop production through floods and dry spells and animal husbandry through 
diminished access to pasture and water.  
 
Commerce and trade have been affected negatively by insecurity through disrupted 
trade flows, increases in transaction costs, risks to formal sector financial activities 
and outflow of investment due to uncertainty. Trade, especially in agriculture, has 
been impacted by the conflict through the destruction of institutions as well as 
transport routes. It has underscored increased transaction costs in the requisition of 
taxes and tribute from producers by Boko Haram, increased transport costs and 
diminished trade levels. This has had a direct impact on rising food prices in the 
region and beyond. Commercial activities have been challenged by insecurity through 
uncertainty that has forced FDI divestments from the region. There has also been high 
risk exposure to financial services that have served to limit access to consumers and 
risk a retreat of associated activities to less formal spaces.  
 
It is possible to highlight interconnections between the national and subnational levels 
of the economy in terms of the consequences of the conflict. The limited evidence that 
is available suggests interlinkages on FDI, in that the reported divestments from the 
North-East have remained in the national economy by shifting operations to other 
major Nigerian cities. As such bar relevant transaction costs, the conflict has 
underscored an outward shift of resources from the subnational sphere that remains 
relevant to the national picture. On food security the instability at the level of the 
national economy in terms of declining oil prices and the consequent depreciation of 
the Naira has reduced the competitiveness of food imports, which has undermined 
food availability given food production challenges. Significantly, the prospect of 
famine is likely to impact on public expenditure and thus influence fiscal dynamics at 
the strategic national level. Reconstruction of the agricultural sector, with cognisance 
of climate variability impacts, will  draw on federally allocated resources as 
delineated in the Agricultural Revitalization Master Plan of PINE. A final point of 
note is that production and trade disruptions in the North-East are affecting food 
prices in the South of Nigeria. This outcome reflects the degree of reliance of the 
South on local food supply given the reduced competitiveness of food imports across 
Nigeria as a result of the depreciation of the Naira.  
 
In presenting this original analysis of the developmental consequences of the ongoing 
Boko Haram-led violent insurgency it has been possible to reflect robustly on the 
complexities that attend the conflict-development trajectory. Focus has been 
innovatively on the extent to which the conflict has influenced dynamics at the levels 
of the national and subnational economy. Evidence suggests a high degree of 
containment of the repercussions of the conflict at the subnational level, indeed at the 
national level the economy exhibits a greater degree of integration with the global 
economy. Nonetheless interlinkages between the national and subnational spheres 
have been identified. This interrogation also shows that generalised assumptions 
about the ways through which conflict affects development hold in some regards. This 
is clearly the case with fiscal adjustments, disruption of trade flows and agricultural 
production as well as commerce but less with economic growth and FDI flows at the 
macro level.  The value of the case study approach has been reinforced in the 
deployment of this study. Along the conflict-development trajectory, it has 
highlighted the complexities associated with the interrelatedness among variables 
across international, national and subnational spaces. 
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